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Running title: Measuring Chinese MNE activity 
 
The Pitfalls of Using Foreign Direct Investment Data to Measure 
Chinese Multinational Enterprise Activity 
 
 
Dylan Sutherland* and John Anderson† 
 
 
Abstract:  
The growth of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNE) has stimulated great interest in their outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) strategies, particularly among academics in business and management 
studies. To date, however, serious methodological shortcomings plague empirical studies in these 
disciplines. Specifically, the vital issue of how Chinese MNEs use and route FDI via tax havens and 
offshore financial centres is not adequately dealt with. These practices have created large geographical, 
industrial composition and volume biases in Chinese outward FDI data. Using a sample of 100 
Chinese MNEs, we illustrate how the use of tax havens and offshore financial centres has created 
these biases, and examine the implications for understanding Chinese MNE activity.  
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Articles in The China Quarterly have made important contributions to understanding the 
rapid international expansion of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNE).
1
 However, the 
majority of research on Chinese MNEs can now be found in business and management 
journals. In a recent literature review in a leading management journal, for example, over a 
hundred such peer-reviewed journal papers were identified.
2
 A key question found in this 
literature relates to whether conventional models of the MNE, which are based predominantly 
on the Western development experience, are helpful and relevant for understanding Chinese 
MNEs.
3
 As a result, a large body of empirical work has sprung up exploring the motivations 
for Chinese MNE activity using outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) data, with many 
studies employing statistical methods using large datasets of officially reported OFDI
4
. 
However, making effective use of Chinese OFDI data is far from straightforward, as it is 
prone to significant geographical, industrial composition and volume biases. These biases are 
primarily caused by Chinese MNEs establishing offshore holding companies in tax havens 
and offshore financial centres (hereafter THOFCs).
5
  
Offshore jurisdictions, of course, are central to the operation of most MNEs today, as 
the recent high profile media cases of Starbucks and Google illustrate. Yet, Chinese MNEs 
appear to have a particularly high propensity to use THOFCs owing to a number of historical 
factors.
6
 For example, Chinese enterprise income tax law favoured foreign MNEs for many 
years by granting them lower rates of corporation tax. This created powerful incentives for 
domestic businesses to move themselves offshore and “round-trip” capital back to China, 
thereby transforming themselves into foreign-invested MNEs eligible to benefit from the 
lower tax rates.
7
 Limited access to domestic capital markets, moreover, has spurred private 
sector businesses to find alternatives, sometimes via the use of offshore financing channels.
8
 
Hong Kong, along with other havens closely linked to it, in particular the British Virgin 
Islands (hereafter BVI) and Cayman Islands (CI), all of which are historically linked as 
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belonging to the former British Empire, has provided a very convenient conduit for offshore 
financing.
9
 In order to circumvent domestic interference and restrictions on their OFDI 
projects, some Chinese businesses have routed FDI to and via offshore vehicles.
10
 These 
factors have all driven Chinese businesses to set up offshore companies, meaning that 
Chinese FDI has had an unusually large bias towards THOFCs, and Hong Kong, the BVI and 
CI in particular. Indeed, by 2010 over 60 per cent of Chinese FDI stock was channelled to 
THOFCs, compared to an average of around 25 per cent for developed market economies.
11
  
The main purpose of this article is to explore further how Chinese MNEs use 
THOFCs and why this has created geographical, industrial composition and volume biases in 
Chinese FDI data. We also consider the implications for existing empirical research on 
Chinese MNE activity. We show how and why the overwhelming majority of studies in the 
business and management literature that use Chinese OFDI data suffer from serious 
methodological shortcomings. The use of THOFCs to incorporate offshore companies creates 
serious distortions to all Chinese outward FDI data, making it very difficult to track and 
properly understand Chinese MNE activity. This article therefore serves as a timely reminder 
to all those who use Chinese OFDI data to explore Chinese MNE activity that this data 
cannot always be taken at face value.
12
  
We start by explaining how investments in offshore companies constitute FDI and the 
research questions this raises in light of existing empirical studies on Chinese MNEs. We 
then explain our method for exploring the use of THOFCs by Chinese MNEs. Following this, 
we outline and discuss our results, based on a sample of 100 Chinese MNEs, and explore the 
implications for geographical, industrial composition and volume biases. Our conclusion 
argues that most of the current empirical research on Chinese MNEs, particularly in the 
business and management fields, is seriously compromised as a result of the common use of 
THOFCs by Chinese MNEs to engage in FDI. Some alternative approaches are outlined. 
 
Tax Havens, Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and the Problem of Measuring MNE 
Activity 
MNEs often diversify their investments geographically through various organizational 
structures, including what are referred to as “offshore special purpose entities” (usually 
abbreviated to SPE).
13
 Although there is no single, universal definition for SPEs, they do 
share a number of common features. They are legal entities that “have little or no 
employment, or operations, or physical presence in the jurisdiction in which they are created 
by their parent enterprises. These are typically located in other jurisdictions, such as tax 
havens and/or offshore financial centres.”(cite needed for quote) SPEs are often used as 
devices to raise capital or to hold assets and liabilities, and usually do not undertake 
significant production. According to the most recent OECD benchmark definition of FDI, the 
“core business of SPEs is to channel funds between entities outside the country where they 
are established ... The role of these SPEs is merely to serve as a financial turn table for 
enterprises in other countries” (cite needed for quote) (emphasis added). Compilers of FDI 
data, moreover, argue that SPEs “hardly affect domestic economic activity and do not reflect 
genuine investment activities in or of the reporting country itself” (cite needed for quote) are 
these all from source in fn 14? YES  (emphasis added). Accordingly, the question for those 
involved in tracking foreign investment is: “how to ensure that the geographical and 
industrial allocation of such investment is not distorted.”14 
Elsewhere, the idea of a distinction between genuine and non-genuine FDI has also 
been discussed, in particular with reference to the biases inherent in FDI data as a measure of 
MNE affiliate activity.
15
 Investment-holding companies, financing subsidiaries, conduits, 
shell companies, shelf companies and brass-plate companies are all examples of SPEs. The 
currently employed OECD guidelines, outlined in the third edition of the Benchmark 
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Definition of FDI (1996) (revised, although not yet implemented, in the fourth edition), state 
that investments in SPEs, even though they engage in little physical production, should be 
incorporated in FDI data.
16
 This inclusion stems from an earlier recommendation by the IMF 
in its Balance of Payments Manual, which has been followed since the early 1990s: 
 
 
Whatever the structure (e.g., holding company, base company, regional headquarters) or purpose (e.g., 
administration, management of foreign exchange risk, facilitation of financing of investments), SPEs are 
an integral part of the structure of the direct investment network as are, for the most part, SPE 
transactions with other members of the group.
17
 
 
As noted, the use of SPEs by MNEs is common and the biases for FDI data also 
significant.
18
 In this regard, Chinese businesses have followed similar if not even more 
extreme paths in their use of havens. Since 2002, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
has compiled China’s FDI statistics in accordance with the OECD/IMF’s balance-of-payment 
guidelines.
19
 THOFCs have also consistently figured prominently as major recipients of 
China’s officially compiled outward FDI, implying that there is FDI associated with the 
transfer of assets and equity from mainland PRC businesses to SPEs in these jurisdictions. 
The triad of three former British colonies and crown dependencies – Hong Kong, the BVI 
and CI – particularly stand out (see Figure 1). Chinese MNEs, as we later show, frequently 
incorporate at least one SPE within each of these three jurisdictions, forming a geographically 
diversified investment triad holding company structure.  
It is important to note that the biases are caused by both direct FDI transfers to these 
offshore SPEs to facilitate “round-tripping” as well as the less frequently discussed, though 
equally serious, problem of “onward-journeying.”20 Round-tripping involves moving capital 
offshore to a SPE only to bring it back onshore again, so inflating outward (and inward) FDI 
data. Laws offering foreign businesses lower rates of tax, as noted, encouraged Chinese 
businesses to use offshore companies to round-trip over many years. Onward-journeying, in 
contrast, involves establishing an offshore SPE and using this vehicle to conduct further FDI 
in third countries. The initial investment to the offshore SPE is mistakenly recorded as 
genuine value-adding activity (particularly in the case of FDI to Hong Kong). Investments 
made via SPEs to third countries, by contrast, are not recorded at all in official Chinese OFDI 
data (following current OECD guidelines). Rather, these are recorded as OFDI from the 
THOFC in which the SPE is formed. Nonetheless, these onward-journey investments are also 
very significant in terms of their volume and cannot be overlooked.
21
  
The use of SPEs creates genuine problems in using FDI data to measure MNE activity, 
both in terms of identifying the ultimate geographical destination of FDI as well as its 
targeted industrial sector (i.e. manufacturing, natural resources, services and so on): “where 
funds are simply channelled through holding companies, major problems are created 
concerning the geographical and industrial composition of FDI.”22 Geographical composition 
biases are created in two ways: (a) initial FDI to an offshore SPE host (i.e. typically in Hong 
Kong, the BVI or CI in the Chinese case) is incorporated in aggregate FDI data, following 
OECD/IMF guidelines;
23
 and (b), further FDI is directed via an offshore SPE to another 
country, the ultimate recipient of FDI (i.e. “onward-journey” as opposed to “round-trip” FDI).  
The initial FDI to an offshore SPE will lead to an overestimation of genuine FDI (i.e. 
that associated with productive, value-adding MNE activities). However, once these offshore 
vehicles are established, onward-journey FDI will not be recorded in the official FDI data of 
the ultimate source country (i.e. China), but rather the immediate source (i.e. typically among 
the triad THOFCs).
24
 This leads to underestimations of FDI to ultimate final destinations. 
These two counteracting forces lead to volume biases, the size of which depends upon the 
relative volumes of (a) and (b).  
 4 
How big are these biases? As regards (a), the overwhelming importance of recorded 
FDI to the triad of THOFCs (i.e. Hong Kong, the CI and BVI) (see Figure 1) in official 
Chinese MOFCOM OFDI data points to its significant scale. Between 2003 and 2010, for 
example, on average around 80 per cent of officially recorded FDI flows were destined for 
the triad THOFCs alone.
25
 Clearly, if such FDI is disregarded, the actual growth of Chinese 
OFDI looks far less impressive. As regards (b), there are as yet no accurate estimates, 
although as our sample will later show, these flows are certainly large enough to require 
incorporating in all serious studies on Chinese MNE activity.  
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]  
As well as volume biases, the use of these SPEs in THOFCs also creates industrial 
composition biases. Commonly used SPEs, particularly among Chinese MNEs, are 
investment-holding companies (i.e. SPEs that hold investments in other corporations). 
Investment-holding companies are considered as financial corporations and therefore are 
classified as providing business services, despite the fact that they may own businesses in 
different industries, such as manufacturing or mining.
26
 It is also not uncommon for 
investment-holding companies (and more generally all types of SPEs) to be registered as 
simultaneously providing a variety of other business services. This may include consulting, 
management services, marketing, holding of brand names/patents, trading and so on. 
Sometimes, companies may be established under the sole banner of providing services but are 
in reality SPEs. The addition of service functions to SPEs facilitates MNE tax minimization. 
Offshore SPEs of this type can legally charge service fees to affiliated companies. In doing so, 
profits can be moved to more favourable tax locations.
27
 
Official Chinese aggregate OFDI data therefore also reflects the common use of 
service companies, which corresponds to the unusually large industrial biases noted. By far 
the largest single recipient of Chinese OFDI, for example, is the “leasing and business 
services” sector. In 2010, this service category received over US$30 billion of outward FDI 
flows.
28
 To put this in perspective, the flow of FDI to services stood at well over double the 
combined flows to mining and manufacturing (see Table 1). This unusual decomposition of 
China’s OFDI by industry has been picked up by some recent academic work as it does not 
correspond to areas of business in which China is renowned as having comparative 
advantages.
29
 As yet, however, no persuasive explanation has been forthcoming for the 
apparent anomaly. We will later show that this aggregate OFDI data captures the large 
industrial composition biases that are created by the use of SPEs.  
[Please insert Table 1 about here]  
Given these potential issues with geographical, industrial composition and volume 
biases, care must be taken when using both aggregate and firm-level FDI data as an indicator 
of the genuine FDI activities of MNEs.
30
 It seems that China’s MOFCOM data (shown in 
Figure 1), currently one of the most popular sources for statistical studies on Chinese OFDI, 
is not a promising source for investigating Chinese MNE activity. Despite this, to date, many 
empirical studies in business and management journals test the country location determinants 
of Chinese OFDI using this aggregated official OFDI data (Table 3). Surprisingly, around 
half of these studies also incorrectly include OFDI to THOFCs, including the Hong Kong, the 
BVI and CI triad, in their statistical analyses. Moreover, the vast majority of the 
aforementioned studies do not address the SPE issue. Huang and Wang (2011), for example, 
include tax havens (such as the Bahamas and Luxembourg).
31
 Duanmu (2012), using a 
provincial-level data source, also includes a number of offshore subsidiaries (i.e. BVI, Samoa 
and Liechtenstein), as does Duanmu and Guney (2009), and Zhang and Daly (2011).
32
 
Armstrong (2011), an exception, acknowledges the SPE problem but simply ignores the 
biases introduced “as there are no more reliable sources.”33 The rest, with few exceptions, 
include Chinese OFDI to Hong Kong but exclude other THOFCs (Table 3). This also is 
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highly problematic, as Hong Kong is a major offshore financial centre (OFC) and tax haven 
and an important location for Chinese SPE creation (discussed below, also see Table 2). The 
few statistical studies that use data collected at the firm-level, moreover, also make no 
attempt to distinguish between what could be an SPE and what could be a foreign subsidiary 
engaged in value-adding activities (i.e. manufacturing, sales, trading and so on, see Table 3). 
As we will show, many Chinese MNEs go to some length to disguise the real reasons for SPE 
creation. The use of SPEs in THOFCs, therefore, also affects most studies that use hand-
gathered firm-level FDI data, as well as those cross-country studies that use official national-
level OFDI data.  
The frequent inclusion of THOFCs, particularly BVI, CI and Hong Kong triad, as OFDI 
destinations in the empirical literature (see Table 2 and Figure 1) raises the question of the 
extent to which Chinese MNEs establish SPEs in these jurisdictions and undertake FDI to, 
and subsequently from, them. At present, the aggregate official FDI data undoubtedly point to 
the use of triad SPEs, but there is no systematic firm-level evidence mapping such FDI. 
Furthermore, the onward-journey component of Chinese OFDI (i.e. that undertaken via SPEs) 
is also entirely overlooked in the empirical literature, even in the minority of studies which 
correctly identify geographical biases.
34
 Yet, this type of FDI may be of significant volume 
and also systematically different to other Chinese OFDI not routed via THOFCs. If so, even 
the findings of these more careful studies also need to be treated with caution. The following 
specific questions therefore emerge with respect to the three biases introduced by offshore 
investments:  
1. Geographical composition biases:  
a. Do Chinese MNEs typically establish SPEs in the triad THOFCs? 
b. Is there evidence that FDI from China to SPEs incorporated in this triad takes 
place? 
2. Industrial composition biases: 
Are these SPEs classified as providing “business services,” creating industrial 
composition biases?  
3. FDI volume biases:  
a. Is there firm-level evidence to suggest that Chinese businesses engage in 
further onward-journey FDI via these offshore holding companies?  
b. If so, how extensive is it?  
 
Methods for Exploring the Use of THOFCs by Chinese MNEs 
Owing to the secrecy THOFCs offer, a key challenge is identifying, at the firm-level, ways in 
which SPEs are used by Chinese MNEs. Unsurprisingly, research in this area across most 
academic disciplines remains limited. One of the few useful prisms through which to gain an 
idea of how they are used, however, is by looking at the way in which publicly listed Chinese 
companies on foreign stock exchanges use SPEs. Depending upon the market, many listed 
companies are actually required by law to publish details of their corporate structures, 
including the type of offshore holding company structures they use. 
A large number of Chinese businesses are now listed outside of China – for example, 
there are over 550 in Hong Kong alone.
35
 To make our data collection manageable and as we 
are interested in the three areas of bias that SPEs create, we are selective. We focus only on a 
sub-sample of offshore-listed Chinese companies that have already been identified as 
undertaking “onward-journey” FDI (i.e. have invested FDI via their offshore SPEs to third 
countries, establishing other foreign subsidiaries, excluding investments to other SPEs).
36
 
This is to ensure that they are engaged in genuine FDI activity, according to OECD (1996) 
criteria, such as manufacturing, research and development, or raw material extraction, outside 
of China. For example, Mindray Medical International (MMI) is a leading developer, 
 6 
manufacturer and marketer of medical devices worldwide headquartered in Shenzhen. It has 
rapidly developed an international presence via its worldwide aftersales service and has over 
20 genuine (i.e. not investment-holding) subsidiaries around the world (including in Italy, 
Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Spain, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Egypt, Thailand, India, Indonesia, the UK and France). It also completed a large 
(US$209 million) acquisition of a US company, Datascope, in May 2008. MMI’s two major 
shareholders and founders are Xu Hang (徐航, 28.6 per cent of votes held) and Li Xiting (李
西廷, 30.7 per cent), marking it out has a highly entrepreneurial private sector Chinese MNE 
which owns its foreign subsidiaries via offshore investment-holding companies.
37
 
As we are particularly interested in how Chinese MNEs structure OFDI via tax 
havens (and the volume biases this creates), we focus here only on those MNEs, like MMI, 
that own their foreign subsidiaries via offshore SPEs. Furthermore, we only look at these 
“onward-journey” investments for MNEs with listed subsidiaries on the stock exchanges of 
Hong Kong (42), Singapore (31) and NYSE/NASDAQ (27). This leaves exactly 100 Chinese 
MNEs meeting our sample criterion (Table 2). Identifying SPEs in THOFCs, even from 
annual reports, is not always straightforward, as many MNEs wish to disguise their offshore 
activities (a BVI incorporated company, for example, may be officially recorded as a “sales” 
subsidiary when in reality it has no actual employees in the BVI and is in fact used for tax-
related purposes
38
). Using our sample of MNEs, we focus only on identifying and recording 
one specific type of SPE. We concentrate on the number and jurisdiction of those companies 
recorded in annual reports as “investment-holding company” SPEs (which helps address our 
first research question). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 present aggregate information on the 
jurisdiction of incorporation of these SPEs, all found in recognized THOFCs, including that 
of the listing vehicle. Focusing only on investment-holding companies likely underestimates 
the true number of SPEs in our sample. This is because, in some cases, as the OECD warns: 
“companies that appear to be merchandising, insurance or other financial or shipping 
companies are really SPEs.”39 Once identified, we also look for evidence that initial FDI from 
China to these SPEs actually takes place (research question 1b.). To do this, we use annual 
reports and also, when necessary, initial public offering prospectuses, which generally outline 
such structures for the benefit of prospective investors. To address the related question of 
industrial composition biases, we also note examples of the additional types of services 
provided by these SPEs, when applicable, as recorded in their own financial statements. 
These data are derived primarily from the notes associated with consolidated financial 
statements in annual reports. 
Two questions concerning our sample arise. First, do unlisted companies also use 
offshore SPEs in a similar way to our publicly listed sample firms? In other words, is the use 
of SPEs by our sample firms at all representative of other non-publicly listed Chinese MNEs? 
Extensive qualitative research conducted in private Chinese MNEs also reports the common 
use of SPEs by these businesses in the havens of Hong Kong, BVI and the CI.
40
 We consider 
it likely, therefore, that our sample is typical of other unlisted Chinese MNEs. Even if it is not, 
the volume, industrial composition and geographical biases illustrated by our sample firms 
are in and of themselves large enough to distort official Chinese OFDI data significantly, as 
we will show.  
Second, is the use of SPEs in our onward-journey sample representative of other 
Chinese companies listed outside of China? It is relatively straightforward to compare our 
sample to other publicly listed Chinese companies that do not onward-journey, and we find 
that it is indeed also very common for these businesses to use SPEs in the triad jurisdictions. 
Our sample is therefore typical of hundreds of other Chinese businesses that list on foreign 
stock exchanges, as well as being representative of a much larger population of both listed 
 7 
and unlisted Chinese businesses that use offshore SPEs to structure both international and 
domestic investments. We now elaborate on our findings regarding geographical, industrial 
composition and volume biases, discussing their implications in light of current research on 
Chinese MNEs.  
 
Geographical Composition Biases 
Our 100 MNEs extensively use offshore SPEs in the triad THOFCs (Table 2). They have 
been actively involved in undertaking FDI to these offshore SPEs, as well as actively using 
them to structure onward-journey FDI. The BVI was the most commonly used jurisdiction 
(with 154 SPEs, averaging 1.5 per MNE in the sample), followed by Hong Kong (81) and the 
CI (59). The number of triad-based SPEs therefore stood at 301, far outnumbering those in all 
the other THOFCs (i.e. Bermuda, Samoa, etc., which totalled less than 50). Moreover, many 
of our sample firms simultaneously held at least one SPE in each of the triad jurisdictions 
(Figure 2). Of the 42 Hong Kong-listed companies, 23 had at least one Cayman Islands SPE 
(usually the listing vehicle), one British Virgin Islands SPE and one Hong Kong-incorporated 
SPE. The Cayman Islands, it should be noted, is particularly popular as a listing vehicle 
jurisdiction. This is because it was, until very recently, the only THOFC with agreements 
with both the United States and Hong Kong stock exchanges that allowed businesses 
incorporated in its jurisdiction to list on either market, so maximizing potential listing values 
(recently the BVI has also attained this status). In the United States sample, 11 of the 23 
companies also had a triad structure. For the Singapore-listed companies, 11 had the dual 
BVI and Hong Kong holding company structure beneath the listing vehicle, in this case 
usually incorporated in Bermuda or Singapore. From our sample of 100 onward-journey 
MNEs, 34 contained the triad holding company structure, including at least one SPE in Hong 
Kong, BVI and CI (Figure 2).  
[Please insert Figure 2 about here]  
This holding company structure helps to explain both the large geographical and 
industrial composition biases evident in MOFCOM’s official Chinese OFDI data (see Figure 
1). By looking at our sample firms, we can see that Chinese OFDI to SPEs does indeed take 
place. We also know that asset injections of onshore PRC businesses into offshore SPEs 
constitutes official Chinese OFDI as companies like MMI, described above, must seek 
official approval from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) for such 
transactions. On 21 October 2005, SAFE issued its important “Notice on Issues Related to the 
Administration of Foreign Exchange in Fundraising and Round-Trip Investment Activities of 
Domestic Residents Conducted via Offshore Special Purpose Companies” (commonly known 
as “Circular 75”). Effective from 1 November 2005, it superseded all previous rulings and 
was one of the first major attempts to clamp down on the use of THOFCs by Chinese 
businesses. Circular 75 states that: 
 
PRC residents, which include both legal and natural persons, must register with the relevant SAFE 
branches with respect to their overseas investments in offshore companies if they use assets or equity 
interests in their PRC entities as capital contributions to establish offshore companies or inject assets or 
equity interests of their PRC entities into offshore companies to raise capital overseas.
41
 
 
The injection of onshore assets, including equity transfers to offshore SPEs in reverse 
investments, following OECD/IMF guidelines, constitutes outward FDI.
42
 As it is 
retrospective, Circular 75 means that all Chinese businesses listed outside the PRC prior to 
October 2005, including those in our sample, must refer to the potential impacts of Circular 
75 on their businesses in their annual reports and/or IPO prospectuses. All of our sample 
firms have done so owing to legal requirements. This indicates their universal and significant 
involvement in such OFDI activity. As noted, MMI is a typical example. MMI is a CI 
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incorporated listing vehicle. It owns four further SPEs, including two in the BVI and two in 
Hong Kong. According to its annual report:  
 
To enable us to raise equity capital from investors outside of China, we set up a holding company 
structure by establishing our current holding company, Mindray International [CI], on June 10, 2005 … 
Mindray International became our holding company in September 2005 when the majority of our existing 
shareholders transferred, through a series of linked transactions, approximately 91.1% of the equity of 
Shenzhen Mindray to Mindray International. In April 2006 we acquired approximately 8.9% of the equity 
in Shenzhen Mindray with the result that our holding company owns approximately 99.9% of the equity 
of Shenzhen Mindray. In May 2006, we changed our name to Mindray Medical International Limited.
43
 
 
MMI illustrates how OFDI to the CI, one of the important triad THOFCs already identified, 
may take place. Other examples illustrate how such asset injections and equity transfers to 
Hong Kong and the BVI also take place. 
Another typical case taken from our sample illustrating how FDI is directed to a 
holding company based in Hong Kong is China Mingfa, a large Chinese commercial, 
residential and hotel property developer listed in Hong Kong. According to its IPO 
prospectus, in 2006 China Mingfa injected the assets of its seven PRC subsidiaries, valued at 
134.6 million yuan, into a Hong Kong incorporated investment-holding company.
44
  
China Sunergy, a final example, is a producer of solar panels and modules based in 
Nanjing, with 2,870 employees. Its major shareholder and founder is a Chinese entrepreneur, 
Lu Tingxiu (陆廷秀), who owns 28.9 per cent of its shares. It is one of the earliest solar cell 
manufacturers in China, dating back to 2004, and now has joint ventures in Turkey and sales 
offices in Mumbai, Tokyo, Germany, France and Italy.
45
 However, technically it is like our 
other examples: a foreign invested company. An investment-holding company was 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands prior to its IPO on NASDAQ in 2007 (see below). Its 
initial equity transfer from China was to a BVI incorporated investment-holding SPE:  
 
Our operating subsidiary, Sunergy Nanjing, was incorporated in August 2004 in Nanjing, China. China 
Sunergy Co., Ltd., or Sunergy BVI, our holding company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, 
acquired all of the equity interests in Sunergy Nanjing in April 2006 through a series of transactions that 
we have accounted for as a legal reorganization. As part of a restructuring in anticipation of our initial 
public offering, we incorporated China Sunergy Co., Ltd., or Sunergy, in the CI on August 4, 2006. 
Sunergy became our ultimate holding company upon its issuance of shares to the existing shareholders of 
Sunergy BVI on August 30, 2006 in exchange for all shares of equivalent classes that these shareholders 
previously held in Sunergy BVI. In December 2007, Sunergy BVI incorporated China Sunergy (Hong 
Kong) Co. Limited., or Sunergy Hong Kong, in Hong Kong. During the same month, Sunergy BVI 
transferred all of the equity interests in Sunergy Nanjing to Sunergy Hong Kong, which became the direct 
holding company of Sunergy Nanjing. We conduct substantially all of our operations through Sunergy 
Nanjing.
46
 
 
China Sunergy illustrates again the typical triad structure often used by Chinese MNEs. 
These three examples illustrate how SPEs in the triad of Hong Kong, BVI and the CI are used 
to receive Chinese OFDI and also hold and invest in other foreign subsidiaries. This in turn 
leads to the large geographical biases in official Chinese FDI data illustrated in Figure 1.  
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Implications of geographical biases  
 
Our sample of Chinese MNEs shows that FDI to SPEs in the triad of THOFCs is common. 
The fact that the geographical biases in Chinese FDI data caused by the use of offshore 
companies is not more widely recognized and addressed is surprising. More than two decades 
ago, Cantwell warned that, because of this problem, “The significance of offshore banking 
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centres as sources and recipients of FDI tends to be overstated.”47 For example, while official 
MOFCOM data suggest that as much as 60 per cent of Chinese OFDI goes to Hong Kong, 
Dussel Peters (2012) shows using commercial mergers and acquisitions databases that the 
real value of Chinese OFDI to Hong Kong may be less than half of this (around 27 per cent 
between 2000 and 2011).
48
As noted, however, of all the statistical studies currently exploring 
Chinese OFDI strategies, nearly one-third incorrectly include FDI directed to the triad 
THOFCs. This leads to some questionable results relating to the inclusion of these small 
island economies, which typically have high quality domestic institutional environments, low 
tax rates, but a lack of natural resources. Duanmu (2012), a case in point, mistakenly includes 
THOFCs (including the BVI) in her econometric analysis of the determinants of Chinese FDI. 
One of her noticeable results, contrary to the findings of other studies that do not include 
THOFCs, is that natural resources are not a significant attractor of Chinese OFDI and that 
there is even a “surprising negative sign” (i.e. investments are attracted to non-resource rich 
jurisdictions, such as THOFCs).
49
 Other such examples include Huang and Wang’s (2011) 
finding that overall market size is not a statistically significant predictor of Chinese FDI 
(THOFCs are typically small markets).
50
 Armstrong (2011) also finds that “quality of 
institutions and governance” have a bearing on FDI performance (THOFCs have good 
institutions). All of these findings may be an artefact of the inclusion of THOFCs in the 
empirical analysis, as these well-managed but resource-poor small island economies will bias 
the empirical results in these directions.  
While the majority of studies do actually acknowledge and discuss the THOFC 
problem and the biases they may create (Table 3, column 3), many still incorrectly include 
Hong Kong as a host country in their statistical modelling (Table 3, column 4). However, as 
the China Mingfa example illustrates, it is common for Chinese MNEs to direct FDI to SPEs 
incorporated in Hong Kong. In fact, there are 81 Hong Kong incorporated SPEs in our 
sample of 100 MNEs alone (Table 2). It is clearly incorrect to include all FDI to Hong Kong, 
as reported in official statistics, as genuine FDI (i.e. non SPE-related). OFDI to Hong Kong, 
of course, provides a major dilemma for empirical studies of this nature. Hong Kong seems 
too large a recipient of Chinese FDI to be ignored entirely –it accounted for around 60 per 
cent of all Chinese OFDI stock by 2010 (see also Figure 1). Some FDI to Hong Kong must 
also clearly be related to productive, value-adding MNE activities (i.e. for the purposes of 
seeking new markets, efficiency and so on). At the same time, however, it is also a major 
offshore financial centre and, as shown, many Chinese companies establish SPEs in Hong 
Kong (Table 2). As illustrated in the China Sunergy case, Hong Kong-based SPEs are also 
tightly integrated in the triad structure with BVI and CI incorporated SPEs. Such a structure 
facilitates the transfer of capital between these offshore SPEs (interestingly, a major 
destination of Hong Kong’s officially recorded OFDI is the BVI).51 Excluding FDI to the CI 
and BVI but incorporating FDI to Hong Kong, as many studies do, therefore makes little 
logical sense (see Table 3).  
Buckley et al. (2007), for example, is one of the earliest and most widely referenced 
(over 900 Google Scholar citations at last count) empirical papers to include OFDI to Hong 
Kong. They look at the period from 1984 to 2001 and test some of the “general principles of 
the theory of FDI.”52 It is surprising that the SPE problem and “round-tripping,” which was 
significant at this time,
53
 and their possible influence on their OFDI data, are not discussed. It 
is not clear whether any of the approved FDI projects included within the study were located 
in other THOFCs (i.e. the BVI, CI), as neither disaggregated nor adequate descriptive data for 
the actual sample is given. Many of the more recent studies also follow the precedent set by 
Buckley et al. (2007) of including Hong Kong as an FDI destination for Chinese MNEs 
(Table 3). Wang et al. (2011) use more recent MOFCOM data (2006–07) and also include 
Hong Kong but do not discuss the treatment of FDI to THOFCs.
54
 Yet, it is clear from their 
 10 
descriptive statistics that Hong Kong is an important host country in their sample. Cheung 
and Qian (2009) also empirically investigate the determinants of Chinese FDI using country-
specific approved OFDI data. Again, they look at the links between Chinese outward FDI and 
the characteristics of the host countries so as to discover potential determinants. They are 
aware “of the uncertainty about the quality of China’s ODI data.”55 Discussion of the tax 
haven issue, however, is still relegated to a single footnote and Hong Kong remains included 
in their econometric analysis while three THOFCs, Bermuda, the CI and the BVI, are 
explicitly excluded. A number of other papers also follow this strategy, and in so doing, fail 
to provide adequate justification for Hong Kong’s inclusion as a host country for Chinese 
FDI.
56
 As a result of incorporating SPE-related FDI to Hong Kong, many of these studies 
also find that markets with close cultural and geographic proximities and a high percentage 
share of ethnic Chinese among the population make attractive hosts for Chinese MNEs and 
their FDI.
57
 Again, these findings are likely to be a direct consequence of the erroneous 
inclusion of SPE-related FDI, which inflates the importance of Hong Kong in these empirical 
analyses.
58
  
The minority of studies that use firm-level data may potentially be able to disentangle 
SPE-related OFDI by excluding investments in and from SPEs in THOFCs in their analysis. 
However, even in these studies there is inadequate recognition of the problem of geographical 
composition biases. In particular, FDI to Hong Kong is accepted as genuine value-adding 
activity. Yiu, Lau and Bruton (2007), for example, do not specify in the sample of Chinese 
MNEs they use whether SPEs are included as subsidiaries or not, and do not even discuss this 
important issue.
 59
 While Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet (2012) do briefly note that there 
may be an issue with FDI to THOFCs, it is also not at all clear whether or not the data issues 
this creates are properly dealt with or that they fully understand them. They claim that their 
method allows them to “avoid the tax haven problem that has plagued other similar studies.” 
Pg no. of quote in footnotes? Yet, in constructing their specifically designed dependent 
variable of Chinese FDI (using company annual reports), they clearly state that they include 
“any overseas investment.”60 Investment-holding companies in Hong Kong (or elsewhere) 
fall into this category, as well as SPEs dressed up as “service” companies or other businesses. 
Furthermore, Hong Kong must have been one of the host countries included in their count 
data, as they note that the 59 countries they include accounted for 80 per cent of total outward 
investment in the 2006–08 period (as reported by MOFCOM). Such a high proportion would 
not be possible if Hong Kong were excluded.
61
  Finally, some other firm-level studies do 
correctly exclude investments to the triad THOFCs but then mistakenly go on to include 
investments to other popular destinations for SPEs. Meyer et al. (2014), for example, 
correctly exclude the triad THOFCs but incorrectly include all investments to the Netherlands 
and Singapore.
62
  As Table 2 shows, SPEs are sometimes also created in these destinations.  
If these firm-level studies are to successfully disentangle and separate SPE from non SPE 
related investments considerably greater care is required. 
In general, even empirical studies that hand collect firm-level data do not adequately 
address the intractable problem of how to distinguish between genuine and SPE-related FDI 
(see bottom of Table 3 for some examples  of firm-level studies). How do these studies deal 
with FDI associated with groups like Longcheer, a very successful, privately owned, mobile 
handset designer found in our sample that has a Hong Kong subsidiary registered as being 
involved in both “investment holding” as well as “manufacturing”?63 At present, these vital 
data issues are entirely ignored in all but a handful of empirical studies using FDI data.
64
 
 
Industrial Composition Biases: Results and Discussion  
The use of SPEs and other subsidiaries in THOFCs, as noted, also creates problems for the 
measurement of the industrial composition of FDI. Our sample illustrates at least three 
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reasons why this is so. First, our sample of 100 MNEs has 346 registered SPEs (including 
listing vehicles) (Table 2). While owning operational businesses across a wide range of 
sectors, investment-holding companies technically deliver “business services” and are 
classified as such for the purposes of registering FDI data.
65
 Second, matters are further 
confused by the recording of more than one activity in such SPEs (i.e. the aforementioned 
Longcheer). As well as “investment holding” services, for example, a wide variety of other 
activities are also recorded as simultaneously being provided in these SPEs. The provision of 
consulting, marketing and management services, and the holding of brands or patents that can 
be leased back to mainland subsidiaries, for example, are all commonly recorded in offshore 
SPEs. Extrawell Pharmaceutical (incorporated in CI, listed in Hong Kong) develops, 
manufactures and sells pharmaceutical products, including the commercial exploitation of 
genome-related technology and oral insulin products (416 employees). Two professors from 
Fudan University founded and own 42 per cent of the company. It has subsidiaries in the BVI 
holding “gene invention rights.”66 Guangzhou based Bawang Group (incorporated in CI, 
listed in Hong Kong in 2007) designs, manufactures, trades and distributes Chinese herbal 
products (3,390 employees). Bawang reports a Hong Kong subsidiary involved in 
“investment holding” as well as “trading of household and personal care products.” 67 
Similarly, China Agrotech (incorporated in the CI and listed in Hong Kong) manufactures 
and trades fertilizers, pesticides and other agricultural products (1,000 employees). It has an 
investment-holding SPE in Hong Kong which also engages in “general trading and export.”68 
As in the Longcheer example, the use of offshore companies serving multiple functions, 
although usually with strong biases towards services, makes it very difficult to know exactly 
how such MNE subsidiaries should be treated. Are they actually involved in any real business 
activities, be it service related or otherwise, or are they simply SPE shell companies created 
for other reasons, like avoiding tax and circumventing restrictive domestic regulations?  
Third, there are examples of offshore subsidiaries in the triad, particularly the BVI, 
which are not recorded as being investment-holding SPEs, but most likely are. This raises the 
question of whether these investments are genuine FDI projects or not. China Qinfa, a large 
coal producer and trading group, has two subsidiaries in the BVI registered as providing 
“sales and logistics services.”69 Extrawell Pharmaceutical also has a BVI subsidiary which 
holds its “gene invention rights” as well as providing “marketing and distribution” services. 
Extrawell also has Hong Kong subsidiaries involved in the “provision of agency services.”70 
Bawang has a BVI subsidiary that is registered as providing “marketing and promotion 
services,” but not as investment holding.71 It is not at all clear how these types of offshore 
subsidiaries should be dealt with, as to all intents and purposes they are likely to be SPEs. 
This is particularly problematic for the very large number of “trading,” “sales” and “service” 
related companies established as subsidiaries in Hong Kong in our sample. They may well be 
SPEs established for the purposes of minimizing tax. All of these issues create very serious 
difficulties for the aforementioned firm-level studies (see Table 3), as well as official data 
collection. Empirical studies cannot rely upon such FDI data.  
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Implications of industrial composition biases 
 
One of the clearest manifestations of the problems SPEs create can be found in the area of 
industrial composition biases. By 2010, 30.7 per cent of China’s total OFDI stock, by far 
China’s largest OFDI category, was in “leasing and business services.” By contrast, only 19.7 
per cent was found in the combined total of the “mining” and “manufacturing” industrial 
categories (Table 1).
72
 We contend that a significant portion of official MOFCOM data 
captures the service activities of investment-holding companies in the triad and their 
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frequently accompanying other business service functions, as well as the leasing back of 
brands, patents and trademarks.  
There are other ways of illustrating how SPEs create these industrial composition 
biases (i.e. towards services). Some studies (although to date still a minority) rely upon 
commercial mergers and acquitions databases (for example, Dealogic, SDC Thomson 
Financial, FT FDI Intelligence Database), as opposed to MOFCOM or firm-level data.
73
 
Unlike in the official recording of FDI data, these commercial databases do account for the 
use of offshore SPEs by MNEs, as they are only interested in ultimate beneficial owners and 
the final target jurisdictions. They do not, therefore, suffer from the same problems as 
officially recorded FDI data. As a result, we would expect a far lower volume of FDI to the 
business services categories using this data. Our own estimates using the Thomson ONE 
mergers and acquisitions database (which excludes greenfield FDI) shows that for all 
completed FDI deals up until the end of June 2012, only 78 out of a total of 1,548 took place 
in the “business services” standard industrial classification codes, which constitutes 5 per 
cent of the total number of transactions and less than 1 per cent by value. Other studies using 
commercial databases make similar findings, illustrating the lower share of FDI to business 
services when calculated in this way. Schuler-Zhou and Schuller (2009), for example, show 
that mergers and acquisitions were heavily concentrated in mining (65 per cent of the total 
volume of deal activity) and manufacturing (25 per cent) for the period 2003–06 under 
comparison. Services, in contrast to the official MOFCOM data, accounted for less than 2 per 
cent of the volume of deal value and roughly the same in number.
74
 Similarly, Sun et al. 
(2012) for the period 2000–08 show that energy minerals/mining, oil and gas exploration 
were by far the largest target industries (with over 46 per cent of total deal volume). Business 
services, by contrast, were negligible.
75
 Dussel Peters (2012), using a similar approach, also 
shows that business services are lower when measured using commercial databases.
76
 All of 
this evidence stands in stark contrast to the official MOFCOM data (see Table 1) which 
shows an overwhelming and incongruous predominance in business services and leasing. 
The high volumes of FDI to the leasing and business services industrial categories are 
not explained at all well in most current studies (Table 3). Statistical studies in the business 
and management literature do not seem to realize the significant industrial composition biases 
created by SPEs. As such, they tend to take the MOFCOM data at face value, despite the 
incongruously high volumes of service-related FDI. Huang and Wang (2011), for example, 
note the extremely high share of services and conclude that: “most surprising was the 
distribution of Chinese ODI between manufacturing and service industries. The 
manufacturing sector accounted for an extremely low share, only 4.72 [%] of the total.”77 
Similarly, Liu, Buck and Shu (2005) also note that “trade and services dominate the picture” 
of Chinese OFDI.
78
 Cheung & Qian (2009) remark: “Two observations stand out: the growth 
of the trade and trade services sector and the fading importance of the manufacturing 
sector.”79 Even Kolstad and Wiig (2012), who are generally far more careful with their use of 
OFDI data than others, do not relate the high level of business services to the industrial 
composition biases created by SPEs in THOFCs. Instead, in commenting on the unusually 
high levels (54 per cent of all flows for their period, larger than any other category), they 
suggest it is “likely that service industry investments gravitate more towards developed 
countries,” without explaining why. It is far more likely that the high preponderance of 
offshore SPEs registered as providing business services is driving these industrial 
composition biases.
80
 In contrast to geographical biases, these industrial composition biases 
have so far received no proper recognition, which illustrates how little the academics in the 
business and management fields currently understand about the recording of Chinese (and 
other) OFDI data. 
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Systematic Volume Biases in Chinese FDI Measurement 
The related geographical and industrial composition biases inevitably also lead to large 
volume biases in official FDI data. Our sample of 100 MNEs by definition have all created 
offshore SPEs (346 in total, Table 2) with a preference for the triad of THOFCs. They refer in 
annual reports (and IPO prospectuses) to the ways in which they have injected mainland 
Chinese assets into these SPEs and in so doing have directed FDI from China to these 
offshore companies. Owing to legal requirements, all of these sample MNEs comment on the 
impact of Circular 75 in their annual reports, necessarily implying that they have undertaken 
FDI to their SPEs. Estimating the actual volume of such OFDI, however, is unfortunately not 
possible. This is because only in some instances are actual values given (for example, China 
Mingfa). Consequently, there are huge problems in trying to ascertain the correct volume of 
Chinese OFDI that is related to SPEs and that which is related to productive, value-adding 
MNE activity. To date, very few studies acknowledge and discuss these issues. 
Our sample of 100 Chinese MNEs was also specifically selected on the basis that each 
MNE had also engaged in “onward-journey” FDI activity (i.e. FDI in foreign countries 
directed via a THOFC to an entity other than an investment-holding company). Further 
analysis of this sample reveals the often conservative nature of their outward investment 
strategies, as well as the heavy involvement of private sector entrepreneurs in these MNEs. 
China Sunergy, for example, started its international expansion with a number of modest 
sales-related subsidiaries in Europe and Hong Kong.
81
 China Qinfa owns four coal mines in 
Shanxi province (1,745 employees). It is one of the leading non-state owned coal companies 
and is also engaged in transportation, sales and shipping. It is owned and controlled by a 
Chinese entrepreneur (Xu Jihua(徐吉华 ) with 57.8 per cent of its shares). Its foreign 
subsidiaries are mainly in Hong Kong and are involved in sales and trading.
82
 China 
Agrotech, which is majority owned by its two founders, has a general trading company based 
in Hong Kong.
83
 Bawang Group, the privately owned herbal products manufacturer, sells its 
products internationally (i.e. Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, 
Brunei and Australia) and has foreign subsidiaries in Hong Kong which are involved in 
advertising and trading.
84
 Extrawell Pharamaceutical has foreign subsidiaries in Hong Kong 
(involved in the development and commercialization of insulin products), and a marketing 
and distribution subsidiary in Malaysia.
85
 Finally, Longcheer, founded in 2002 in Shanghai 
by three young Chinese entrepreneurs, who remain the major shareholders, is one of the 
largest Chinese mobile handset designers in China (which is the largest mobile telephone 
market in the world, with around 700 million users). The company has 1,200 employees and 
has been among the fastest growing companies in China. Longcheer also has overseas 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, India and Vietnam.
86
  
These cases illustrate first that onward-journey FDI is strongly associated with private 
sector Chinese MNEs, many of which have made considerable efforts to circumvent domestic 
restrictions and raise foreign capital.
87
 As such, the exclusion of the FDI from THOFCs when 
using official data is likely to systematically exclude private sector MNE activity. Any 
conclusions reached when using such data for empirical analysis are therefore biased. Second, 
qualitative evaluation of the FDI in these cases also suggests that it tends to be rather modest 
and risk averse in nature. The 100 MNEs in our sample have made onward-journey type 
investments (i.e. via THOFCs) in a wide range of business areas that span many countries, 
including: the US (36), Russia (2), Australia (3), Uruguay (1), Hong Kong (76), Singapore 
(18), Taiwan (2), Italy (7), Turkey (1), Brazil (1), Germany (13), Macau (3), Vietnam (2), 
South Korea (4), Japan (13), Thailand (1), Malaysia (4), Papua New Guinea, India (1), Macau, 
France, Netherlands (1) and Canada (3). Further careful analysis of the sample firms shows 
that they created 216 foreign MNE subsidiaries with investments of at least US$683 million 
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(Table 2). The vast majority of these investments, however, were sales, trading and 
marketing-related investments, with only a very small minority involving larger, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. This finding contradicts claims made in much of the business and 
management literature that Chinese MNEs exhibit aggressive, high risk, strategic asset-
seeking behaviour, involving large acquisitions in developed markets that target technologies, 
brands and management know-how.
88
  
 
Implications of volume biases 
Reporting only immediate destination flows will almost certainly lead to positive volume 
biases for THOFCs and negative biases for non-THOFCs, as FDI routed via offshore 
jurisdictions is currently missed. Furthermore, volume biases seem to be present in every 
econometric study on Chinese MNEs published to date. Of the studies reviewed in Table 3, 
only three seem to have correctly identified the geographical composition biases created by 
using Chinese FDI data.
89
 They all still go on to model Chinese OFDI statistically – two of 
them use the same official data sources. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) note the inherent secrecy of 
THOFCs and argue that the “nature and ultimate destinations of FDI flows are difficult to 
discern … For this reason, these flows likely reflect motives different from other FDI 
flows.”90 Their solution is simply to exclude OFDI to all THOFCs in their econometric 
modelling. Similarly, Cheng and Ma (2007) also acknowledge that Hong Kong should be 
excluded: “Since FDI that goes into ‘tax havens’ and ‘offshore financial centers’ will 
typically be invested elsewhere, they are not the ultimate destination of the FDI.”91 While it is 
an improvement on previous approaches, excluding THOFC FDI still does not adequately 
incorporate onward-journeying FDI routed via SPEs. As our sample shows, this is of 
significant volume, exceeding $500 million for our 100 MNEs alone (Table 2). So this 
approach is, in fact, no solution at all. Moreover, as onward-journey FDI appears to differ 
systematically from officially registered FDI in so far as it is more strongly driven by the 
private sector and does not typically have a strategic asset-seeking focus, its omission is 
likely to bias the results towards the finding that strategic asset-seeking is taking place.
92
  
  
Conclusion 
Our contribution here is to show how Chinese MNEs often incorporate investment-holding 
companies in specific THOFCs, typically involving the triad jurisdictions of Hong Kong, the 
CI and BVI. We have shown how they not only direct FDI to these jurisdictions from China, 
but also that they route significant volumes of further FDI from these offshore locations to 
other countries. Drawing from a sample of 100 MNEs that have all used THOFCs in these 
ways, we demonstrate how geographic, industrial composition and volume biases are created 
in Chinese OFDI data as a result. We also have shown how these biases give rise to 
misleading results in much of the empirical literature that looks to explain Chinese MNE 
activity. While there are now over a hundred articles in the business and management fields 
exploring Chinese MNE activity, with many studies using econometric methods applied to 
officially published OFDI or firm-level data, the vast majority do not properly account for the 
ways in which Chinese MNEs route investments to and via offshore holding companies. As a 
result, a large number of empirical studies have been incorrectly accepted as rigorous 
scientific contributions to the understanding of Chinese MNE activity.  
Future research should make greater efforts to account for the specific historical 
context in which China’s MNEs have emerged and the idiosyncratic investment patterns 
these conditions have fostered. It could build upon the approach used here as well as those 
being developed elsewhere.
93
 For example, larger samples of Chinese MNEs that have 
invested FDI via THOFCs should be analysed. This could be done by broadening the search 
among publicly listed companies. Owing to their greater levels of transparency, such 
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companies provide a window of opportunity to examine the use of THOFCs further. Greater 
use and analysis of commercial databases that track ultimate ownership will also potentially 
provide further important insights into the extent and nature of Chinese FDI that is routed via 
THOFCs. As well as this, it may also be possible to undertake more fine-grained, firm-level 
qualitative research to ascertain the extent and nature of THOFC use. Using these approaches, 
it will be possible to make more detailed comparisons between onward-journey FDI routed 
via THOFCs and that undertaken directly from China. By doing so, further light will be shed 
upon the nature of existing geographical, industrial composition and volume biases, and a 
firmer basis from which to understand Chinese MNE activity can be developed. 
 
 
摘要: 近年来，中国跨国公司的快速成长引起了外界对其对外直接投资战略的广泛关
注， 这一关注在商务学及管理学两个研究领域尤为突出。然而，目前在这两个学科领
域进行的实证研究中普遍缺乏严谨的方法论作为支撑，尤其是中国跨国公司对外直接
投资流向避税港和离岸金融中心这一关键课题被普遍忽略。 笔者认为，目前学术研究
中广泛采用的中国对外直接投资数据在地理位置、行业结构以及规模上均存在较大偏
差。因此，本文以 100 家中国跨国公司为样本，详细解读对外直接投资相关数据如何
因涉及避税港及离岸金融中心而产生偏差，从而加深对中国跨国公司活动及其影响的
理解。 
关键词: 中国跨国公司;外直接投资; 特殊目的实体; 避税港; 离岸金融中心; 外
直接投资偏差. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 16 
Figure 1: Geographical and Industrial Composition of China’s Outward FDI Flows (as % 
of China’s Total), 2003–2010 
 
Source:  
MOFCOM 2010.  
Note:  
“Other tax haven and OFCs” comprises 44 countries.  
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of China’s Outward FDI Flows and Stock by Industry, 2010 
(US$ millions) 
 
 FDI flows  Share of total 
flows (%) 
FDI stock Share of total 
stock (%) 
Mining  5,714 8.3 44,660 14.1 
Manufacturing  4,664 6.8 17,801 5.6 
Leasing and business 
  services 
30,280 44 97,246 30.7 
Total  68,811 100 317,210 100 
 
Source:  
MOFCOM 2011. 
 
Figure 2: A Typical Triad SPE Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
Annual reports. 
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Table 2: The Geographical Distribution of Offshore Investment-Holding Companies in the Sample of 100 MNEs  
Sample market 
Number of 
MNEs in 
sample 
Jurisdiction of 
listing vehicle 
Jurisdictions of other SPEs 
Number of 
Chinese 
operating 
subsidiaries 
Number of 
“onward 
journey” 
foreign 
subsidiaries 
Total FDI to 
foreign 
subsidiaries (US$ 
millions) 
Hong Kong 42 
CI(36) 
HK (2) 
Bermuda (4) 
BVI (71); HK (47); CI (3); 
Macau (1); Netherlands (1); 
Samoa (1) 
455 94 239 
Singapore 31 
Bermuda (18) 
Singapore (12) 
CI (1) 
BVI (42); Hong Kong (17); 
Singapore (4); Samoa (1); 
Mauritius (1); US (1) 
154 37 72 
NYSE/NASDAQ 27 
CI (22) 
BVI (3) 
Antigua (1) 
HK (1) 
BVI (41); HK (17); US (3); 
PRC (3); Luxembourg (1); 
Samoa (1); Canada (1); 
Singapore (1) 
178 85 >372 
Totals 100 
CI (59) 
Bermuda (22) 
HK (3) 
CI (1) 
Singapore (12) 
 
BVI (154); HK (81); CI (3); 
Singapore (5); Macau (1); 
Netherlands (1); Mauritius (1); 
Luxembourg (1); Samoa (1); 
Canada (1) 
787 216 
 
683 
 
Source:  
As reported in most recent company annual reports (either 2010 or 2011) downloaded from respective stock exchange websites. 
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Table 3: Examples of Research that Incorrectly Uses Official FDI or Firm-Level FDI Data Sources to Explore Chinese MNE Activity  
Author and year of study Type of data used in the 
empirical study 
Tax haven problem 
acknowledged and 
discussed? 
OFDI to Hong Kong 
included 
OFDI to other THOFCs 
included in the study? 
Duanmu 2012 Province level No Yes  BVI and Samoa 
Armstrong 2011 MOFCOM and OECD Yes Yes All havens included 
Huang and Wang 2011 MOFCOM No Yes  All havens included 
Zhang and Daly 2011 MOFCOM No Yes All havens included 
Duanmu and Guney 2009 
UN/ASEAN/Ministry of 
Finance Japan/BEA 
No Yes All havens included 
Wang et al. 2011 MOFCOM and ARIES No Yes Probably 
Cheung and Qian 2009 MOFCOM Yes Yes No 
Cheng and Ma 2008 MOFCOM Yes Yes Yes/No 
Buckley et al. 2007 Approved OFDI data Yes Yes Probably 
Liu, Buck and Shu 2005 UNCTAD/MOFCOM Yes Yes Probably 
Kang and Jiang 2011 MOFCOM (FDI stock) No Yes No 
Hurst 2011 MOFCOM Yes Yes No 
Wang et al. 2012 MOFCOM and ARIES No  Yes Probably 
Cheng and Ma 2007  MOFCOM Yes Yes/no Yes/no 
Kolstad and Wiig 2012 UNCTAD Yes No No 
Rodriguez and Bustillo 2011 OECD/National/ASEAN Yes No No 
Cui and Jiang 2012 MOFCOM  No  Yes  Probably 
Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet Firm-level data  Yes  Yes Probably 
Yiu, Lau and Bruton 2007  Firm-level data No Yes Probably  
Pan et al. 2014 Firm-level data No  Yes Yes 
Meyer et al, 2014 Firm-level data Yes No Yes 
Xia et al., 2014 Firm-level data No Yes Probably 
Zhou and Mauro 2014 Firm-level data  No  Yes Probably 
 
Sources:  
See column 1. 
 20 
References 
Armony, Ariel. C. 2012. “A view from afar : how Colombia sees China.” The China Quarterly 209, 
178–197.  
Armony, Ariel. C., and Julia C. Strauss. 2012. “From going out (zou chuqu) to arriving in 
(desembarco): constructing a new field of inquiry in China–Latin America interactions.” The 
China Quarterly 209, 1–17.  
Armstrong, Shiro. 2011. “Assessing the scale and potential of Chinese investment overseas: an 
econometric approach.” China & World Economy 19(15), 22–37. 
Bawang Group. 2012. Annual Report (online), 
http://202.66.146.82/listco/hk/bawang/annual/2011/ar2011.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2012.  
Beugelsdijk, Sjoerd, Jean-François Hennart, Arjen Slangen and Roger Smeets. 2010. “Why and how 
FDI stocks are a biased measure of MNE affiliate activity.” Journal of International Business 
Studies 41(9), 1444–59. 
Buckley, Peter J., Jeremy L. Clegg, Adam R. Cross, Xin Liu, Hinrich Voss and Ping Zheng. 2007. 
“The determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment.” Journal of International 
Business Studies 38(4), 499–518. 
Buckley, Peter J., Dylan Sutherland, Hinrich Voss and Ahmad El-Gohari. 2013. “The economic 
geography of offshore incorporation in tax havens and offshore financial centres: the case of 
Chinese MNEs.” Journal of Economic Geography. DOI: 10.1093/jeg/lbt040. 
Cantwell, John. 1992. “The methodological problems raised by the collection of foreign direct 
investment data.” Scandinavian International Business Review 1(16), 86–102. 
Cheng, Leonard, and Zihui Ma. 2007. “China’s outward FDI: past and future.” Working Paper No. 
2007706001E, School of Economics, Renmin University, China. 
Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Xingwang Qian. 2009. “The empirics of China’s outward direct investment.” 
Pacific Economic Review 14(3), 312–341. 
Child, John, and Susanna B. Rodrigues. 2005. “The internationalization of Chinese firms: a case for 
theoretical extension?” Management and Organization Review 1(3), 381–410. 
China Agrotech. 2010. Annual Report (online), 
http://pg.jrj.com.cn/acc/HK_DISC/stock_time/2008/10/30/01073_000702554_0.PDF. 
Accessed 15 December 2011. 
China Qinfa Group. 2011. Annual Report (online), 
http://www.qinfagroup.com/file_pdf/EW0866CIR20110630E.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2012. 
China Sunergy. 2011. Annual Report, https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001396247&type=&dateb=&owner=include&start=40&c
ount=40. Accessed 6 May 2012. 
CSDHK. 2008. External Direct Investment Statistics of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Census and 
Statistics Department. 
Cui, Lin, and Fuming Jiang. 2012. “State ownership effect on firms’ FDI ownership decisions under 
institutional pressure: a study of Chinese outward investing firms.” Journal of International 
Business Studies 43(20), 264–284. 
Deng, Ping. 2011. “The internationalization of Chinese firms: a critical review and future research.” 
International Journal of Management Review 14(4), 408–427. 
Deutsche Bank. 2009. Mingfa Group (International) Company Limited Global Offering, 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/advancedsearch/search_active_main.aspx. 
Accessed 11 November 2011. 
Duanmu, Jingling. 2012. “Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Chinese multinational enterprises 
(MNEs).” Journal of World Business 47(8), 64–72. 
Duanmu, Jingling, and Yilmaz Guney. 2009. “A panel data analysis of locational determinants of 
Chinese and Indian outward foreign direct investment.” Journal of Asia Business Studies 3(2), 
1–15. 
Dussel Peters, Enrique. 2012. “Chinese FDI in Latin America : does ownership matter ?” Global 
Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University Discussion Paper 33, 1–24. 
Dussel Peters, Enrique. 2013. “Characteristics of Chinese overseas foreign direct investment in Latin 
America (2000–2012).” Contemporary International Relations 23(5), 105–130. 
 21 
Extrawell Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited. 2012. 2011 Annual Report (online), 
www.extrawell.com.hk/catalog/pdf/AR2011_E.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2012. 
Fung, Hunggay, Joy Yau and Gaiyan Zhang. 2010. “Reported trade figure discrepancy, regulatory 
arbitrage, and round-tripping: evidence from the China–Hong Kong trade data.” Journal of 
International Business Studies 42, 152–176. 
Gonzalez-Vicente, Ruben. 2012. “Mapping Chinese mining investment in Latin America: politics or 
market?” The China Quarterly 209, 35–58. 
Guest, Paul, and Dylan Sutherland. 2010. “The impact of business group affiliation on performance: 
evidence from China’s ‘national champions’.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 34, 617–631. 
Hearn, Adrian. H. 2012. “Harnessing the dragon: overseas entrepreneurs in Mexico and Cuba.” The 
China Quarterly 209, 111–133. 
Huang, Yiping, and Bijun Wang. 2011. “Chinese outward direct investment: is there a China model?” 
China & World Economy 19(21), 1–21.  
Hurst, Luke. 2011. “Comparative analysis of the determinants of China’s state-owned outward direct 
investment in OECD and non-OECD countries.” China & World Economy 19(17), 74–91. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 1993. Balance of Payments Manual (5th ed.). Washington, DC: 
IMF.  
Jenkins, Rhys, and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa. 2012. “Fear for manufacturing? China and the 
future of industry in Brazil and Latin America.” The China Quarterly 209, 59–81.  
Kang, Yuanfei, and Fuming Jiang. 2012. “FDI location choice of Chinese multinationals in East and 
Southeast Asia: traditional economic factors and institutional perspective.” Journal of World 
Business 47(1), 45–53. 
Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. 2012. “What determines Chinese outward FDI.” Journal of World 
Business 47(8), 26–38. 
Liu, Xiaohui, Trevor Buck and Chang Shu. 2005. “Chinese economic development, the next stage: 
outward FDI?” International Business Review 14(18), 97–115. 
Longcheer. 2012. Annual Report (online), http://www.longcheertel.com/pdf/reports/LC-
2010_Annual_Report.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2012. 
Luo, Yadong, and Rosalie L. Tung. 2007. “International expansion of emerging market enterprises: a 
springboard perspective.” Journal of International Business Studies 38(4), 481–498. 
Matthews, John A. 2006. “Dragon multinationals: new players in 21st century globalization.” Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management 23, 5–27. 
Meyer, Klaus. E., Yuan Ding, Jing Li and Hua Zhang. 2014. Overcoming distrust: How state-owned 
enterprises adapt their foreign entries to institutional pressures abroad. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 45(8), 1005–1028. doi:10.1057/jibs.2014.15 
MOFCOM. 2010. Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Beijing: China 
Statistics Press. 
Naughton, Barry. 2007. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
MMI (Mindray Medical International). 2011. Annual Report (online), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1373060/000119312512194979/d293110d20f.htm. 
Accessed 11 November 2012. 
Ning, Lutao, and Dylan Sutherland. 2012. “ Internationalisation of China’s private sector MNEs: an 
analysis of the motivations for foreign affiliate formation.” Thunderbird International 
Business Review 54(2), 169–182. 
OECD. 1996. OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (3rd ed.). Paris: OECD 
Publications. 
OECD. 2008. OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (4th ed.). Paris: OECD. 
Palan, Ronen, Richard Murphy and Christian Chavagneux. 2010. Tax Havens: How Globalization 
Really Works. Cornell: Cornell University Press. 
Pan, Yigang., Lefa Teng, Atipol B. Supapol,, Xiongwen Lu, Dan Huang and ZhennanWang. 2014. 
Firms’ FDI ownership: The influence of government ownership and legislative connections. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 45(8), 1029–1043. doi:10.1057/jibs.2014.27 
 
 22 
Ramasamy, Bala, Matthew Yeung and Sylvia Laforet. 2012. “China’s outward foreign direct 
investment: location choice and firm ownership.” Journal of World Business 47(1), 17–25. 
Rodriguez, Carlos, and Ricardo Bustillo. 2011. “A critical revision of the empirical literature on 
Chinese outward investment: a new proposal.” Panoeconomicus 58, 715–733. 
Schuler-Zhou, Yun, and Margot Schuller. 2009. “The internationalization of Chinese companies: what 
do official statistics tell us about Chinese outward foreign direct investment?” Chinese 
Management Studies 3, 25–42. 
Strauss, Julia. C. 2012. “Framing and claiming: contemporary globalization and “going out” in 
China’s rhetoric towards Latin America.” The China Quarterly 209, 134–156. 
Sun, Sunny Li, Mike W. Peng, Bing Ren and Daying Yan. 2012. “A comparative ownership 
advantage framework for cross-border M&As: the rise of Chinese and Indian MNEs.” 
Journal of World Business 47(1), 4–16. 
Sutherland, Dylan, and Lutao Ning. 2011. “Exploring ‘onward-journey’ strategies in China’s private 
sector MNEs.” Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 9(1),43–65. 
UNCTAD. 2010. UNCTAD STAT Investment Database. Available online http://unctadstat.unctad.org. 
Accessed 2
 
October 2011.  
Vlcek, William. 2010. “Byways and highways of direct investment: China and the offshore world.” 
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39(4), 111–142. 
Vlcek, William. 2013. “From road town to Shanghai: situating the Caribbean in global capital flows 
to China.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations. DOI: 10.1111/1467-
856X.12010. 
Voss, Hinrich. 2011. The determinants of mainland Chinese outward foreign direct investment. 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. 
Wang, Chenqi, Junjie Hong, Mario Kafouros and Agyenim Boateng. 2011. “What drives outward FDI 
of Chinese firms? Testing the explanatory power of three theoretical frameworks.” 
International Business Review 21(3), 425–438. 
Warner, Malcolm, N.S. Hong and X. Xu. 2004. “Late development experience and the evolution of 
transnational firms in the People’s Republic of China.” Asia-Pacific Business Review 10(3), 
324–345. 
Xia, Jun, Xufei.Ma, Jane Lu, and Daphne W. Yiu. (2014). Outward foreign direct investment by 
emerging market firms: A resource dependence logic, Strategic Management Journal 35(9), 
1343–1363. doi:10.1002/smj 
Yao, Shujie, and Dylan Sutherland. 2009. “Chinalco and Rio Tinto: a long march for China’s national 
champions.” The China Quarterly 199, 829–836. 
Yiu, W.D., C. Lau and Gary.D. Bruton. 2007. “International venturing by emerging economy firms: 
the effects of firm capabilities, home country networks, and corporate entrepreneurship.” 
Journal of International Business Studies 38, 519–540. 
Zhang, Xiaoxi, and Kevin Daly. 2011. “The determinants of China’s outward foreign direct 
investment.” Emerging Markets Review 12, 389–398. 
Zhou, Nan and. Mauro, F. Guillen 2014. From home country to home base: a dynamic approach to the 
liabilty of foreignness. Strategic Management Journal, (February 2013). doi:10.1002/smj 
 
 
 
                                                      
1
 Gonzalez-Vicente 2012; Hearn 2012; Yao and Sutherland 2009. 
2
 Deng 2011.  
3
 Warner, Hong and Xu 2004; Child and Rodrigues 2005; Matthews 2006; Luo and Tung 2007. 
4
 The concept of FDI implies taking a lasting ownership stake, usually in excess of 10% of another company, for 
the purposes of exercising long-term management control of that company. As such, it is the most commonly 
used data for understanding the international expansion strategies of MNEs. 
 23 
                                                                                                                                                                     
5
 The OECD uses four criteria to define a tax haven: (i) no, or nominal taxes; (ii) a lack of transparency; (iii) 
laws or administrative practices that prevent the effective exchange of information for tax purposes with other 
governments on taxpayers benefiting from zero or nominal taxation; and (iv) an absence of a requirement that 
business activity be substantial (Buckley et al. 2013).  
6
 Buckley et al. 2013.  
7
 Naughton 2007.  
8
 Vlcek 2013.  
9
 Dussel Peters 2012. 
10
 Vlcek 2010. 
11
 UNCTAD 2010; MOFCOM 2010. 
12
 For those exploring Chinese investments in Latin America, in particular, this creates a “critical issue” owing 
to the considerable volumes of Chinese FDI channelled to and from Caribbean tax havens (Dussel Peters 2013, 
114). For further analysis of Chinese involvement in Latin America, see Strauss 2012; Armony and Strauss 
2012; Armony 2012; Jenkins and de Freitas Barbosa 2012. 
13
 Beugelsdijk et al. 2010. 
14
 OECD 2008, 186.  
15
 Beugelsdijk et al. 2010. 
16
 OECD 1996, 38. 
17
 IMF 1993, para. 365.  
18
 Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux 2010.  
19
 Cheng and Ma 2007. 
20
 Sutherland and Ning 2011. 
21
 Ning and Sutherland 2012. 
22
 Cantwell 1992, 98. 
23
 Including asset injections and equity transfers involved in reverse takeovers. 
24
 OECD 1996. The 4th edition of the OECD’s Balance of Payments Guidelines (OECD 2008) has proposed 
approaches to overcome the current problems associated with SPEs for FDI data collection, but these have not 
yet been implemented and the 3rd edition guidelines are still being followed.  
25
 As Dussel Peters (2012) notes, this creates particular difficulties for studies investigating Chinese investments 
in Latin America.  
26
 OECD 1996. 
27
 Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux 2010.  
28
 MOFCOM 2010. 
29
 Kolstad and Wiig 2012. 
30
 OECD 2008; Beugelsdijk et al. 2010.  
31
 Huang and Wang 2011. 
32
 Duanmu and Guney 2009; Zhang and Daly 2011.  
33
 Armstrong 2011, 28. 
34
 For instance, Cheng and Ma 2007; Rodriguez and Bustillo 2011; Kolstad and Wiig 2012. See also Dussels 
Peters (2012) for a discussion of the THOFC problem.  
35
 Guest and Sutherland 2010. 
36
 Ning and Sutherland 2012. 
37
 MMI 2011. 
38
 Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux 2010. 
39
 OECD 1996, 41. 
40
 Voss 2011; Vlcek 2013. 
41
 Deutsche Bank 2009. The annual reports of our sample firms all explicitly refer to this circular, often 
repeating the wording reported here.  
42
OECD 1996.  
43
 MMI 2011, 23. 
44
 Deutsche Bank 2009.  
45
 China Sunergy 2011.  
46
 China Sunergy 2011, 33.  
47
 Cantwell 1992. 
48
 Dussel Peters 2012, 13.  
49
 Duanmu 2012, 69.  
50
 Huang and Wang 2011, 11.  
51
 CSDHK 2008. 
52
 Buckley et al. 2007,500.  
 24 
                                                                                                                                                                     
53
 Fung, Yau and Zhang 2010. 
54
 Wang et al. 2011. 
55
 Cheung and Qian 2009, 336.  
56
 Hurst 2011. 
57
 Buckley et al. 2007; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet 2012; Kang and Jiang 2012.  
58
 See Dussel Peters 2012 for further important insights into these geographical composition biases.  
59
 Yiu, Lau and Bruton 2007.  
60
 Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet 2012, 22. 
61 MOFCOM 2010.  
62
  
63
 Longcheer 2012.  
64
 For exceptions, see Dussel Peters 2012, 2013.  
65 OECD 2008. 
66
 Extrawell Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited 2012, 64.  
67
 Bawang Group 2012, 114. 
68
 China Agrotech 2010, 71.  
69
 China Qinfa Group 2011, 146.  
70
 Extrawell Pharmaceutical 2012, 64. 
71
 Bawang Group 2012, 114. 
72
 MOFCOM 2010, 95.  
73
 Dussel Peters 2012; Schuler-Zhou and Schuller 2009. 
74
 Schuler-Zhou and Schuller 2009. 
75
 Sun et al. 2012.  
76
 Dussel Peters 2012.  
77
 Huang and Wang 2011, 7. 
78
 Liu, Buck and Shu 2005, 100. 
79
 Cheung, and Qian 2009, 317. 
80
 Kolstad and Wiig 2012, 27. 
81
 China Sunergy 2011. 
82
 China Qinfa 2011.  
83
 China Agrotech 2010.  
84
 Bawang Group 2012.  
85
 Extrawell Pharmaceutical 2012. 
86
 Longcheer 2012. 
87
 Sutherland and Ning 2011.  
88
 Deng 2011.  
89
 Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Rodriguez and Bustillo 2011; Cheng and Ma 2007. 
90
 Kolstad and Wiig 2012, 28. 
91
 Cheng and Ma 2007, 11. 
92
 See Sutherland and Ning (2011) for a fuller discussion of this point.  
93
 Dussel Peters 2012.  
